[Polity] Constitutional Protection to Civil Servants – Article 311


Civil servants in India enjoy unique protection in terms of specific provisions in Part XIV of the Constitution, which authorize the regulation of their conditions of service. Article 309 stipulates that subject to the provisions of the Constitution, acts of appropriate legislature may regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State.

Under Article 310, - persons serving the Union or a State hold office during the pleasure of the President or the Governor of the State as the case may be. The exercise of this pleasure is, however, circumscribed by the provisions of Article 311. The Article reads as follows :


“Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State–

(1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed.

(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges: Provided that where, it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed: Provided further that this clause shall not apply —
(a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or
(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or
(c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry.


(3) If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry as is referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank shall be final.”


The procedure laid down in Article 311, subject to the provisos, or exceptions, therein, is intended to, first, assure a measure of security of tenure to government servants, who are covered by the Article and, second, provide certain safeguards against arbitrary dismissal or removal of a government servant or reduction to a lower rank. These provisions are enforceable in a court of law and where there is an infringement of Article 311 orders passed by the disciplinary authority are ab-initio void. The provisions of Articles 310 and 311, apply to all government servants. Arguments in favour of retaining Article 311


Article 311 of the Constitution has been a matter of much debate over the past fifty years. Arguments range from its retention in its present form, or even strengthening it, to its total deletion. Those in favour of retaining Article 311 argue that the Article subjects the doctrine of pleasure contained in the preceding Article 310 to certain safeguards. Indeed, this Article earlier also envisaged giving an opportunity to the accused official to protest the quantum of punishment proposed if the charges were proved - this requirement was, however, dispensed with through the 42nd amendment to the Constitution.


It is further argued that the safeguards under Article 311 are focused and that the framers of the Constitution were mindful of the rare eventualities in which even such minimal safeguards would not be necessary. Indeed, the safeguard of an opportunity of being heard has been held to be a fundamental principle of natural justice. Even if Article 311 were to be repealed, it is argued, the need for giving an opportunity to be heard cannot be dispensed with. The requirement that only an authority which is the appointing authority or any other authority superior to it can impose a punishment of dismissal or removal also appears reasonable as the government follows a hierarchical structure where the appointing authority for different categories of employees are assigned to different levels- the obvious principle being that for positions having higher responsibility, the appointing authority is higher up in the hierarchy.


Moreover, if Article 310 stands without the procedural safeguards of Article 311, it is highly unlikely that the rules governing disciplinary proceedings and departmental inquiries can be dispensed with on the ground that the President or the Governor have a right to dismiss an official from service without proving charges after due inquiry. In such a situation the only outcome would be an increase in litigation concerning service matters.


Besides, judicial review is an integral part of our Constitution and a substantial portion of the appellate work of the Supreme Court concerns Article 311. A random check of the decided cases from the Index notes of the Supreme Court cases yields various rulings, which indicate that the Article is not an obstacle in dealing with delinquent public servants: (i) The disciplinary authority is free to take a view contrary to the finding of ‘not guilty’ by the inquiry officer. (High Court v Shrikant Patil 2000 1SCC 416). (ii) Where the charges are proved in a departmental inquiry while the person is acquitted of the same charges in criminal prosecution, acquittal will have no effect on disciplinary action as the degree of proof required in the two proceedings is quite different. (Senior Superintendent v A. Gopalan AIR 1999 SC 1514). (iii) Where the appointing authority is the President or the Governor, it is not necessary for these office-holders to be personally satisfied about the justification for disciplinary penalty. (Union v Sripati Ranjan 1975 4 SC 699).


Arguments in favour of repealing Article 311 3.10.8 But the argument above is itself the starting point of the argument in favour of repealing Article 311. It can be argued that if the decisions of the judiciary did not obviate the need to act against delinquent officials, then why retain the Article with its potential to protect the corrupt through any unintended interpretation? Indeed, it is not as if in all cases involving Article 311 the Supreme Court has taken a ‘pro Government’ stance. There are cases where the apex court has struck down the actions of the disciplinary authority or the Government.

Some instances can be cited illustratively;

(i) Where a temporary servant was accused of accepting bribe, it was held that the matter should have been dealt with in accordance with Article 311 and if proved guilty the penalty of dismissal, instead of termination of service should have been imposed. (Madan Gopal v Punjab AIR 1963 SC 531).


(ii) Where an inquiry was held at a place away from the place of posting and the accused employee could not attend the proceedings due to lack of funds as he was not paid any subsistence allowance (during the period of suspension), it was held that the inquiry was vitiated. (Fakirbhai v Presiding Officer 1986 3 SCC 111).


There are a number of decisions of the lower courts which have tied down the disciplinary authorities with technical detail where the procedure has become more important than the substance.


In present times, the position prevailing in India has to be viewed against the practice followed in other countries, where such punitive action is possible with a hearing permitted at the discretion of the appropriate authority, not as a matter of right. Even in the UK, whose administrative systems were adopted in India, such freedom does not exist. India is perhaps one of very few countries where a public servant, who, though an agent of the government, has the power to invoke Constitutional rights against the government which is his/her employer.


The Constitution has been amended to recognize the needs of governance as felt from time to time. The Indian Constitution, and Part XIV thereof, was drafted at a time when, in the aftermath of partition, and post-colonial administrative upheavals, it was felt necessary to prescribe certain guarantees to the bureaucracy. In the present scenario, that protection does not appear quite necessary. For one, the recent growth of the economy has ensured that Government is no longer the only significant source of employment.


Indeed, in the present debate of even providing outcome oriented contractual appointments for senior positions, there is a new focus on the question of permanency in the civil services. Inflexibility and compartmentalization, created over decades within the bureaucratic structure, has been encouraged by the difficulty in even transferring staff who have rushed to courts against their transfer; this was presumably not the intention of the framers of the Constitution. The increase in corruption and inefficiency in Government has been acknowledged as requiring major “surgery”. The role of Government as a model employer cannot take away from the fact that public good must override individual right, certainly of the corrupt and inefficient public servant.


It is no doubt essential that reasonable opportunity is provided to a government official against what might be arbitrary or vindictive action. But this should be only reasonable, not excessive, and that must be the criteria for assessing the nature of legal protection that the employee must receive. The protection required to be provided in terms of security of tenure or permanancy in the civil service must not lead to a situation where delayed action becomes common reason for emboldening errant officials into committing acts against public interest.


It has been held that, for proper compliance with the requirement of ‘reasonable opportunity’ as envisaged in Article 311(2), a government servant against whom action is contemplated should, in the first instance, be given an opportunity to deny the charges. If, as a result of an inquiry, the charges are proved and it is proposed to impose any of the penalties of dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the findings of the inquiry. It is not necessary to give him any opportunity of making a representation on the penalty proposed after the amendment of clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution with effect from 3rd January, 1977.


The Santhanam Committee had listed as many as 15 criteria laid down by the Supreme Court and the High Courts in order to enable conduct of an inquiry in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution. The interpretations and requirements laid down by the highest courts have made disciplinary proceedings for major penalties very convoluted, tedious and time consuming involving a large number of sequential steps before a person can be found guilty of the charges and punished. The process unfortunately does not end there. Provisions exist for appeal, revision and review only after completion of which, the delinquent officer would begin to suffer the penalty. The accused officer also has the right to challenge the legality of the action of disciplinary authority before the Administrative Tribunal, get an interim stay of the proceedings and relief thereafter, and to substantively appeal against the decision of the disciplinary authority or the government as the case may be in the Tribunal. This apart, he reserves his fundamental right to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme Court protesting the violation of such rights in the conduct of the inquiry.


Understandably, this has given rise to the demand for curtailing rights of the public servant in relation to his employment. The only amendment of any substantial nature that has been affected is to dispense with the requirement of a second opportunity to show cause. The Santhanam committee had observed: “….In view of the constitutional requirements and the judicial pronouncements, we consider that it would not be possible to radically simplify the procedure unless the Constitution is suitably amended. However, we examined the possibility of simplifying the procedure in relation to disciplinary proceedings to the extent possible within the existing legal framework”.


The Hota Committee, while recommending measures to make civil services responsive, citizen, friendly and ethical, has stated as follows:


“We recommend that Article 311 of the Constitution be amended to provide that if there are allegations against a civil servant / person holding a civil post of accepting illegal gratification or of having assets disproportionate to his known sources of income and the President or the Governor is satisfied that the civil servant / person holding a civil post be removed from service forthwith in the public interest, the President or the Governor may pass an order removing the civil servant / person holding the civil post from service and give him an opportunity in a postdecisional hearing to defend himself. If the person removed from service is prosecuted in a court of law, the President or the Governor may also specify by order that a post-decisional hearing may be given to the person removed from service only after a judgement of the court of law acquitting him becomes final and conclusive. The person so removed shall be given a post-decisional hearing in a regular departmental inquiry to defend himself against the charge. If he is exonerated of the charge, he shall be reinstated in service with full restoration of his service conditions, including his seniority, and shall be paid the arrears of pay and allowances due to him in full. In our view, such a Constitutional amendment would : • Facilitate summary removal from service of a corrupt officer; • Inspire confidence in the minds of the common people that corrupt practice by members of the civil service / persons holding civil posts will not be tolerated; • Ensure justice to the official so removed in a post-decisional hearing.”


The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution had recommended :


“Yet the services have remained largely immune from imposition of penalties due to the complicated procedures that have grown out of the constitutional guarantee against arbitrary and vindictive action (Article 311). The constitutional safeguards have in practice acted to shield the guilty against swift and certain punishment for abuse of public office for private gain. A major corollary has been erosion of accountability. It has accordingly become necessary to revisit the issue of constitutional safeguards under Article 311 to ensure that the honest and efficient officials are given the requisite protection but the dishonest are not allowed to prosper in office. A comprehensive examination of the entire corpus of jurisprudence has to be undertaken to rationalize and simplify the procedure of administrative and legal action and to bring the theory and practice of security and tenure in line with the experience of the last more than 50 years”.


The view favouring the deletion of Article 311 argues ultimately that, over time, the provisions of Article 311 have given rise to a mass of judicial pronouncements which have led to much confusion and uncertainty in interpretation. These pronouncements should not continue to have significance and effect on the strength of the continued existence of Article 311. If this Article is deleted, judicial pronouncements based on the Article would no longer be in force and binding. This could be made clear in the statement of objects and reasons of any proposed amendment to the Constitution so that these rulings are not relied upon to claim a protection which was not intended. 

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